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A B S T R A C T
In July 2013 the European Union (EU) imposed restrictions on Chinese solar photovoltaic (PV) manufacturers,
looking to exporting to the EU. In this paper, we consider the impact of this trade barrier, using a sample of 454
stock-listed PV producing ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that the trade barrier erased US$ 8,19 million oﬀ the value of the
average European PV manufacturers and US$ 247.03 million oﬀ the value of the average Chinese PV
manufacturers. We also ﬁnd that while the trade barrier reduced the willingness of the industry to reorganise, it
stimulates Chinese manufacturers to reorganise both their domestic and their international operations. The
latter, we warn, is likely an attempt by Chinese manufacturers to ‘tariﬀ jump’. We conclude, therefore, that the
trade barrier was both ineﬃcient, in that it both hurt the companies it aimed to protect, and ineﬀective, as those
it sought to punish may have circumvented it.
1. Introduction
The Chinese solar photovoltaic (PV) industry has exploded in recent
years. Chinese ﬁrms produced 3 MW (mega-watts) in 2000, and
10,852 MW in 2010 (Algieri et al., 2011), but between 2009 and
2014, the industry again quadrupled in size. In 2014, China accounted
for 64% of global production, and the Chinese PV industry employed
1.6 million people.
The Chinese Government has played an important role in the
growth of this industry. It has, for example, heavily invested in public
R &D spending, but it also heavily subsidised Chinese PV manufac-
turers (Lacey, 2011).1 The subsidies have had two eﬀects. Firstly, it has
enabled Chinese producers to survive where others would not; Haley
and Haley (2013) report that the six biggest Chinese producers had
debt ratios of over 80% in 2012, and conclude that without government
support, all would have gone bankrupt. Secondly, the subsidy has
enabled Chinese producers to produce cheaper products: Chinese
products retail at €0.47/Wp (watt-peak), compared to the European
average of €1.10/Wp.2
Recognising this, the European Union (EU) opened an antidumping
investigation into the Chinese Government´s support for Chinese PV
industry in November 2011, and concluded in July 2013 that the
support was ‘unfair’,3,4. The EU responded by introducing trade
restrictions to protect European manufacturers. Since then Chinese
ﬁrms exporting to Europe have been burdened with: (1) export
restrictions, limiting total sales of Chinese PV to the EU of 7 gigawatts
per year, (2) anti-subsidy (3.5–11.5%) and anti-dumping rates (27.3–
64.9%); and (3) minimum prices of €0.56/Wp. This, the EU trade
commissioner, suggested, would “stabilise the European solar panel
market and remove the injury that the dumping practices caused to the
European industry”.5
But how eﬃcient and eﬀective has that solution been? European
producers have suggested that Chinese ﬁrms are dumping at a price
about the level of the minimum price set by the EU, making them
ineﬃcient. And international business scholars suggest that ﬁrms,
subjected to trade tariﬀs, can often simply reorganise their interna-
tional operations to avoid them, in what is termed ‘tariﬀ jumping’
(Motta, 1992; Belderbos, 1997; Blonigen, 2002) through, for example,
international acquisitions (Neary, 2009).
In this paper, we consider the impact of the European response on
the industry. We consider two questions. Firstly, we consider how the
announcement of the trade barrier impacted the market value of
Chinese and European PV manufactures. We do so using by consider-
ing changes in the ﬁrms market value. We expect that European ﬁrms –
as the intended beneﬁciaries – will have reacted positively to the
barrier, and Chinese ﬁrms – as the intended targets – will have reacted
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1 Most subsidies are indirect. In 2010, for example, the ﬁve largest Chinese producers received low-cost loans of USD 30 billion from the government sponsored Chinese Development
Bank.
2 ProSun (2016).
3 European Commission, 2013
4 The US opened an antidumping investigation in Sept 2012, and came to the same conclusion.
5 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-729_en.htm
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negatively. Secondly, we consider how the announcement impacted the
behaviour of these ﬁrms. We do so by considering changes in
acquisition-making behaviour. We expect that the industry as a whole
will not have changed, but that Chinese ﬁrms will have sought to
circumvent the trade barrier.
2. Methods
2.1. Sample
We build a sample of 454 stock-listed ﬁrms active in the PV
industry in the period 1980–2015. The sample includes companies
from 58 countries and, according to industry observers,6 it represents
11.2% of all ﬁrms active in the total PV industry. We identify PV ﬁrms,
and the (1396) acquisitions that they made, using the Thomson SDC.
We collect data on their share price, and market capitalisation, using
Datastream7.
2.2. Estimating changing market value
We use a standard event-study methodology to estimate the eﬀects
of the trade barrier on the market value of the 454 ﬁrms in our sample
(see e.g. MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). We estimate
the eﬀect as follows. Firstly, we estimated the ﬁrms ‘normal’ perfor-
mance using 250 days of historical (pre-announcement) stock market
data. Using this, we forecast how the ﬁrm's stock should have behaved
in the absence of the announcement. We term this the ﬁrms ‘normal’
return. Next, we collected data on how the ﬁrm actually performed in
the period after the event. Comparing the ﬁrms expected, or ‘normal’
performance, with its ‘actual’ performance, leads to the creation of an
expression referred to as the ﬁrms ‘abnormal’ returns. Finally, we sum
the ﬁrm's abnormal returns over a period of 5 days post-announce-
ment, and correct for wider changes in the stock market on which the
ﬁrm is listed. Doing so, we create a measure of the ﬁrms ‘cumulative
abnormal returns’ (CARs). These are the percentage gains/losses that
the ﬁrm made, in the 5 days after the event, above/below the
expectation of what the ﬁrm should have made, in the absence of the
event. Therefore, the ﬁrm's CARs, multiplied by the ﬁrm's number of
shares, provides an indication of the eﬀect of the event on the ﬁrms
market capitalisation, or value.
2.3. Estimating changing acquisition behaviour
We use standard ordinary least square regression analysis to
estimate the impact of the announcement of the trade barrier on the
acquisition behaviour of the industry. Speciﬁcally, we programme an
indicator variable – Trade_Barrier – which we set equal to 1 if the ﬁrm
made an acquisition after the trade barrier and 0 otherwise, and then
consider if this variable signiﬁcantly impacted the acquisition trends
within the sample.
3. Results
3.1. Changing trade patterns
Fig. 1 reports Chinese PV exports to the world, and Chinese exports
to the EU, in the period 2000–2014.8 The vertical axis reports the value
of the exports in billions of US$. It reports that while Chinese exports
grew throughout the period, exports to the EU dropped signiﬁcantly
once the antidumping investigation started. Chinese exports to the EU
dropped 46.5% in 2012, and by 60.8% in 2013, compared to 2011
levels. In other words, the imposition of the trade barrier, and indeed
the two-year investigation that preceded its imposition, discouraged
Chinese ﬁrms from exporting to the EU. We conclude, therefore, that
the trade barrier signiﬁcantly distorted the trade pattern.
3.2. Changing market value
Results of the event study report that the average ﬁrm in our sample
lost 0.09% on the announcement of the trade barrier (Table 1). In
dollar terms, and given the market capitalisation of the ﬁrms in our
sample, this implies that the average ﬁrm lost USD 102 million, over a
ﬁve day window, in reaction to the announcement of the trade barrier.
For the average European ﬁrm, the loss was 0.08% (or USD 8.19
million per company, given an average market capitalisation of USD
9.5 billion). For the average Chinese ﬁrm the loss was 1.6% (USD
247.03 million per company, given an average market capitalisation of
USD 15.4 billion). In total, we estimate that the ﬁrm in our sample lost
USD 46.5 billion, European ﬁrms (n=231) lost USD 1.8 billion and
Chinese ﬁrms (n=26) lost USD 6.4 billion. We conclude, therefore, that
the impact of the trade barrier was a widespread destruction of ﬁrm
value, with few apparent winners and many obvious losers.
3.3. Changing acquisition behaviour
Table 2 presents results on the eﬀect of the trade barrier on the
merger market. Model 1 considers the impact of the trade barrier on
the total number of acquisitions in the industry, controlling for year
speciﬁc eﬀects (Year). A negative coeﬃcient suggests that fewer
acquisitions were completed after the trade barrier than had been
forecasted to occur in the absence of the barrier.Model 2 considers the
case of acquisitions by Chinese acquirers. The positive coeﬃcient for
the Trade Barrier variable in Model 2 suggests that the Trade Barrier
did have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of acquisitions
involving Chinese ﬁrms. Models 3 shows that the Trade Barrier had a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect too on the number of outbound Chinese
acquisitions. Model 4 and 5 suggest that these conclusions remain
robust control for the overall rise in acquisitions. From this we can
Fig. 1. Chinese PV Exports in Billions $US.
Source: UNCTAD Comtrade database Methodology: Cao and Groba (2013), Steenblik
(2005; 2006) and Wind (2008)
Table 1
The impact on firm value.
SAMPLE N Mean St Dev Average Loss in US$ Total Loss in US$
All 454 −0.0009 0.04327 102.47 4,6524.54
China 26 −0.01601 0.03881 247.18 6426.84
Europe 231 −0.00086 0.02692 8.19 1892.90
6 http://www.enfsolar.com
7 The ﬁrms market capitalisation – also known as market cap or market value – is
estimated as the stock market price per share multiplied by the number of shares
outstanding.
8 The UNCTAD database reports trade volumes for the ‘EU-28′, for the period 2000–
2014.
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summarise and conclude that the Trade Barrier negatively impacted
the wider market, and did not lead the average ﬁrm to reorganise, but it
did lead Chinese ﬁrms to reorganise their operations both domestically
and internationally. Fig. 2 documents that reorganisation. It describes
both the total number of PV acquisitions involving Chinese acquires,
and the number of cross-border Chinese PV acquisitions..
4. Discussion
4.1. Key ﬁndings
We ﬁnd that while the trade barrier signiﬁcantly impacted the
industry, and distorted trade, it appears not to have had the impact that
European regulators had hoped for.
Our results suggest, ﬁrstly, that the trade barrier led to a wide-
spread destruction of value: the trade barrier wiped US$ 8.19 million
oﬀ the value of the average European solar-panel producing ﬁrm –
possibly due to the fact that, at €0.56/Wp, the barrier did not oﬀer
European manufacturers suﬃcient protection – and erased US$
247.03 million oﬀ the value of the average Chinese producer – probably
due to the extra cost that the barrier implied. Thus, the barrier hurt all
manufacturers, albeit for diﬀerent reasons.
Secondly, we report that fewer acquisitions, in general, were done
after the introduction of the trade barrier than had been forecast. This
may be linked to the widespread destruction in value implied by the
barrier. We observe, however, that Chinese acquirers were the excep-
tion to that rule, in that Chinese ﬁrms increasingly reorganised both
their domestic and international operations after the announcement.
Domestic reorganisations may indicate that Chinese ﬁrms have, for
example, looked to improve production eﬃciencies, by increasing their
scale economies, to overcome the additional costs implied by the
barrier. International reorganisation, however, may signal that Chinese
acquirers have also looked to tariﬀ jump, to circumvent the trade
barrier.
We conclude, therefore, that the trade barrier was both ineﬃcient
and ineﬀective. Our results suggest that the trade barrier hurt the
companies it aimed to protect, while simply encouraging those that it
sought to punish to ﬁnd ways to circumvent it.
4.2. Limitations
All research has its limitations. In our case, two limitations are
noteworthy. First, we only consider stock listed ﬁrms. We do so because
non-stock listed ﬁrms do not provide the information necessary for us
to complete our analysis. We recognise, however, that stock-listed ﬁrms
are a speciﬁc type of ﬁrm, and may not be representative of the
industry. Second, we include all stock-listed ﬁrms involved in the PV
industry, but we do not consider their level of involvement in the
industry. We do so for because of data limitation. We recognise,
however, that not all ﬁrms in the sample may derive all of their
revenue from the PV industry, and that there may be within industry
variance. We call on future researchers to look for ways to correct for
both of these limitations.9
5. Conclusions & policy implications
The purpose of the trade barrier, introduced in 2013, was to protect
European ﬁrms from the alleged dumping of PV products by Chinese
manufacturers. We report that while the barrier impacted the industry,
it may not have had the impact that the regulators had hoped for. We
ﬁnd that it indiscriminately damaged the industry, and led to a
widespread destruction of value. In the aftermath, and as European
ﬁrms appear to have struggled, we report that Chinese ﬁrms reorga-
nised operations, potentially in an eﬀort to circumvent the trade
barrier. Our results suggest, therefore, that the trade barrier was both
ineﬃcient and ineﬀective, in that it both hurt the companies it aimed to
protect, while those it sought to punish may simply have circumvented
it. We would call for European regulators, therefore, to look for
alternatives to the trade barrier policy.
Table 2
The impact on firm behaviour.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Total Number of
Acquisitions
Total Number of Chinese
Acquisitions
Total Number of Chinese
Outbound Acquisitions
Total Number of Chinese
Acquisitions
Total Number of Chinese
Outbound Acquisitions
Trade Barrier −23.45** 5.817** 1.555*** 9.555*** 2.110***
(0.0324) (0.0134) (0.000252) (1.29e−06) (1.37e−07)
Number of
Acquisitions
0.159*** 0.0237***
(4.34e−07) (3.35e−05)
Year 2.584*** 0.212*** 0.00458 −0.200** −0.0566***
(3.67e−10) (0.00160) (0.665) (0.0140) (0.000666)
Constant −5122*** −422.3*** −9.110 394.4** 112.1***
(4.35e−10) (0.00165) (0.666) (0.0145) (0.000684)
Years 35 35 35 35 35
Adjusted R-squared 0.709 0.500 0.400 0.776 0.648
pval in parentheses
*p < 0.1.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
Fig. 2. Chinese PV acquisitions.
9 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out these limitations.
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